Endogenous fragmented technology and optimal offshoring in large civil aircraft production

This paper is motivated by two observations in the large civil aircraft (LCA) industry. (1) Boeing and Airbus are significantly different in the degree of offshoring. (2) The degree of offshoring also changes among different aircraft models. To offer an explanation, this paper focuses on issues related to fragmentation. Existing literature has established the tie between fragmented technology and offshoring. However, it is assumed that production can be fragmented readily and at no cost; and only exogenous global economic factors have impact on the degree of fragmentation. This model distinguishes itself from others by incorporating endogeneity in fragmentation. A final-good firm can spend on R&D specifically for its own fragmented technology. As a result, the final-good firm can optimally choose the portion of components to be offshored. A strategic trade policy model is used to show that the degree of offshoring depends on the firm's own cost of production, the host country's cost of production, the global state of technology as well as the government trade policies. In particular, export subsidy and subsidy on R&D of fragmented technology are shown to be policy substitutes. Keywords: Fragmentation; Offshoring; Outsourcing; Aircraft; Export subsidy; R&D subsidy; Boeing; Airbus JEL classification: F12; F13; F23; L13