TY - JOUR TI - Basic Beliefs, the Embryo Rescue Case, and Single-Issue Voting: A Response to Dustin Crummett AU - McNabb, Tyler AU - DeVito, Michael T2 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly AB - In this essay, we respond to Dustin Crummett’s argument that one cannot consistently appeal to body count reasoning to justify being a single-issue pro-life voter if one is also committed to the usual response to the embryo rescue case. Specifically, we argue that a modified version of BCR we call BCR* is consistent with the usual response. We then move to address concerns about the relevance of BCR* to Crummett’s original thesis. DA - 2021/09/09/ PY - 2021 VL - 21 IS - 2 SP - 203 EP - 208 LA - en ST - Basic Beliefs, the Embryo Rescue Case, and Single-Issue Voting UR - https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=ncbq&id=ncbq_2021_0021_0002_0203_0208 Y2 - 2021/09/10/08:41:39 ER - TY - JOUR TI - Has Oppy Done Away with the Aristotelian Proof? AU - McNabb, Tyler AU - DeVito, Michael T2 - The Heythrop Journal DA - 2020/09// PY - 2020 DO - 10.1111/heyj.13604 VL - 61 IS - 5 SP - 723 EP - 731 J2 - Hey J LA - en SN - 0018-1196, 1468-2265 UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/heyj.13604 Y2 - 2021/02/22/09:38:18 ER - TY - JOUR TI - The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response AU - DeVito, Michael AU - McNabb, Tyler T2 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion AB - In this essay, we put forth a novel solution to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, utilizing recent work done by Duncan Pritchard on radical skepticism. Key to the success of Plantinga’s argument is the doubting of the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. We argue (viz. Pritchard and Wittgenstein) that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties constitutes a hinge commitment, thus is exempt from rational evaluation. In turn, the naturalist who endorses hinge epistemology can deny the key premise in Plantinga’s argument and avoid the dilemma posed on belief in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution. DA - 2022/04/29/ PY - 2022 DO - 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3 J2 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion SN - 1572-8684 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3 ER - TY - JOUR TI - Ockham on the Side of the Angels: Why a Classical Theist Shouldn't be Moved by Oppy's Argument from Simplicity AU - McNabb, Tyler AU - DeVito, Michael T2 - New Blackfriars DA - 2022/06/25/ PY - 2022 DO - 10.1111/nbfr.12766 DP - USJ Library SP - nbfr.12766 J2 - New Blackfriars LA - en SN - 0028-4289, 1741-2005 ST - Ockham on the Side of the Angels UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nbfr.12766 Y2 - 2022/06/30/08:43:15 ER - TY - JOUR TI - Divine foreknowledge and human free will: Embracing the paradox AU - DeVito, Michael AU - McNabb, Tyler Dalton T2 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion DA - 2021/02/25/ PY - 2021 DO - 10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1 J2 - Int J Philos Relig LA - en SN - 0020-7047, 1572-8684 ST - Divine foreknowledge and human free will UR - http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1 Y2 - 2021/09/06/03:18:38 ER - TY - JOUR TI - Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis AU - McNabb, Tyler Dalton AU - DeVito, Michael T2 - Religions AB - Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation. DA - 2022/// PY - 2022 DO - 10.3390/rel13010024 DP - USJ Library VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 24 J2 - Religions LA - en SN - 2077-1444 ST - Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism UR - https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/1/24 Y2 - 2022/02/11/09:22:27 ER -